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I. Introduction 
The Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, was a key instrument 
in the democratization process that began in 1975. The fathers of the 
constitution sought to agree on the principles that would sustain the 
new juridical order, which they felt should convey the evolution of so-
ciety, the juridical developments, and the new patterns proposed by 
comparative law. Their prime concern was drafting a constitution that 
would obtain the approval of all, or at least the majority of, the political 
parties.1 This led to a compromise with some institutions—mostly 
those with an ethical or moral foundation—that consequently shaped 
the constitution’s text. As a result, controversies over the interpretation 
of some sections of the constitution have often arisen as legislators take 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of La Coruña (Spain). PhD Jurisprudence, 
University of Santiago de Compostela. Visiting scholar and lecturer at several universities in Eu-
rope and the United States. Author of five books on marriage law and relations between church 
and state and more than thirty articles and book chapters in European and American journals. 
Member of the Spanish Royal Academy of Law and Jurisprudence and Executive Secretary of the 
International Academy for the Study of the Jurisprudence of the Family. This paper was pre-
sented at the Symposium on Whether Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage Is Constitutionally Required 
at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, November 2, 
2012. 
 1. See Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, May 23, 1978, No. 72, 
p. 1155; Pedro Farias, Breve Historia Constitucional de España 30 (1981). 
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steps to develop certain rights and liberties that the constitution rec-
ognizes. This has happened with some of the fundamental rights, in-
cluding the right to life, the freedom of education, and conscientious 
objection, just to mention some. Controversy also followed the right 
to marry, which although not included among the fundamental rights 
and public liberties in the Spanish Constitution, does figure among the 
rights and duties of Spain’s citizens.2 
In July 2005, the article of the Spanish Civil Code that contains 
the definition of marriage (Same-Sex-Marriage Law) was amended.3 
The modification seemed very simple—article 44 stated, “[m]en and 
women are entitled to marry in accordance with the provisions of this 
Code,”4 and the amendment added “[m]arriage shall have the same re-
quirements and effects when both prospective spouses are of the same 
or different genders.”5 Other articles were also modified to replace the 
words husband and wife with cónyuge or consorte—gender-neutral words 
similar to the English spouse or progenitor, designating fathers and 
mothers without distinguishing sex. 
When the procedure for amending the civil code to allow same-
sex marriages began, a flood of reports and statements issued by public 
and private institutions arose, and a predictably overwhelming number 
of articles passionately supporting or opposing this legal change. Ex-
pectedly, a lawsuit asking for the repeal of the amendment of the civil 
code was brought before the Constitutional Court as soon as the 
amendment came into force.6 
 
 2. The relevance of this structure comes, among other reasons, from the different pro-
tections that Spain’s citizens enjoy. All rights and freedoms are binding on all public authorities, 
will be regulated by law—which must respect their essential content—and can be protected 
through appeal to the Constitutional Court. Constitución Española [C.E.] art. 53.1,  Dec. 
29, 1978, Boletín Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.] n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). Fundamental 
rights enjoy stronger protection; citizens may assert claims to protect the fundamental freedoms 
and rights outlined in the Constitution “by means of a preferential and summary procedure be-
fore the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by lodging an individual appeal for protection 
(recurso de amparo) to the Constitutional Court.” C.E. art. 53.2. 
 3. Amending the Civil Code Concerning the Right to Marry (B.O.E. 2005, 13) (Spain), 
available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/07/02/pdfs/A23632-23634.pdf [hereinafter Same-
Sex-Marriage Law]. 
 4. Id. at art. 44. 
 5. Id. 
 6. S.T.S., Nov. 15, 2005 (Spain), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/11/15/pdfs/A37313-37313.pdf. 
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For complicated political reasons, the Constitutional Court did 
not pass a judgment until November 2012—seven years later.7 The 
ruling upholds the Same-Sex Marriage Law.8 It is a lengthy judgment 
that considers all the reasons posed by the plaintiffs as well as the opin-
ions of the public institutions that offered their stance on the topic, 
including the Council of State,9 the General Council of the Judiciary,10 
and the Royal Academy for Jurisprudence and Legislation.11 
Even though this Constitutional Court ruling was supposed to end 
the harsh debates of past years, this article will not focus solely on that 
judgment. There are two reasons for this: First, while the judgment 
says that the Amendment of 2005 is constitutional, it does not say that 
regulating same-sex marriage is constitutionally required, instead leav-
ing the door open to a new bill that may reinstate marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman. Second, the aforementioned reports and 
statements were issued by qualified institutions that reached a different 
conclusion than the Constitutional Court. Therefore, although the 
 
 7. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (S.T.C., No. 198) (Spain), available at http://hj.tribunalconstitu-
cional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/23106. 
 8. Id. 
 9. The Council of State is the Spanish Government’s supreme consultative body. Con-
sultations in regard to bills are not compulsory, but the Government decided to ask for a report 
from this body because of the importance of the matter. The Council of State observed that, due 
to the problems posed by this amendment, it would have been desirable to ask for reports from 
other institutions, both public and private, in order to achieve a better knowledge of the scope of 
the proposed law and its potential effects. See Dictámenes del Consejo de Estado [Council of 
State Opinion], Dec. 16 2004, (B.O.E., Dictámenes del Consejo de Estado, No. 2628/2004) 
(Spain) [hereinafter Report of the Council of State], available at http://www.boe.es/bus-
car/doc.php?coleccion=consejo _estado&id=2004-2628. 
 10. The General Council of the Judiciary is the governing body of judges and courts. It 
can issue reports on the bills that relate to the protection of the fundamental rights. The govern-
ment and this council did not agree that the government was obligated to ask for a report from 
the council on this particular bill, and the Secretary for Justice denied the request from the coun-
cil to send the bill. The council nonetheless decided to deliver a report. See “Estudio” del Consejo 
General del Poder Judicial sobre el matrimonio homosexual, Directorio de Codigos Civiles (Jan. 
2005) http://www.codigo-civil.net/archivado/?p=467 [hereinafter Report of the General Council of 
the Judiciary]. The problem underlying this controversy was the ideological differences between 
the government and the General Council of the Judiciary, due to their respective composition at 
that time. The first pages of the report are devoted to justifying the powers of the council to 
release this item, called a “study” instead of report. See id. 
 11. The Royal Academy for Jurisprudence and Legislation has among its aims the re-
search, appraisal, and contribution to the improvement of the law. The report issued on this 
Amendment of the Civil Code, dated March 1, 2005, is published in Anales de la Real Academia de 
Jurisprudencia y Legislación, n. 35, 937 (2005) [hereinafter Report of the Royal Academy]. 
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Constitutional Court has made its decision regarding the constitution-
ality of this modification of the Civil Code, public institutions are far 
from agreeing on the matter.12  
This article first analyzes the portion of the Spanish Constitution 
devoted specifically to marriage. It then examines the main juridical 
reasoning to uphold or dismiss the constitutionality of the 2005 Same-
Sex Marriage Law. Finally, it gives brief attention applicable statistics, 
taking into consideration the numbers offered by the government be-
fore the approval of the Bill and the reality in the subsequent years. 
II. Marriage in the Spanish Constitution 
The Spanish Constitution states in section 32: 
1. Man and woman have the right to contract matrimony with full 
legal equality. 
2. The law shall regulate the forms of matrimony, the age and capac-
ity for concluding it, the rights and duties of the spouses, causes for 
separation and dissolution and their effects.13 
The first thing that comes to mind is that the wording of this sec-
tion neither explicitly requires nor bans same-sex marriage. This is 
quite understandable given when the constitution was enacted—only 
three years after the regime of General Franco came to an end.14 
Same-sex marriage, as well as other relationships like polygamy or civil 
partnerships, were not among the main concerns of the authors of the 
constitution.15 But, it would be difficult today to hold a debate on mar-
riage that does not mention same-sex marriage at all. Other topics like 
 
 12. I will not consider in this paper all the juridical literature on the matter because it is 
not possible to convey all the scholarly opinions, valuable as they are. I will also set aside other 
problems posed by this amendment not directly related to same-sex marriage as a right, such as 
the powers of the regional entities (comunidades autónomas) to legislate on this matter, or the fili-
ation or adoption by same-sex couples. 
  13. C.E. art. 32. 
 14. This regime was characterized, among other features, for an entanglement between 
the Catholic Church and the State. For more on this issue, see Juan Ferrando Badia, El 
régimen de Franco; Un enfoque político-jurídico (1984). 
 15. See Amending the Civil Code Concerning the Right to Marry, supra note 3. The pref-
ace of Same-Sex-Marriage Law recognizes that the marriage laws from the last century did not 
need to refer to same-sex marriage in any way because homosexual relationships were considered 
by no means able to bear out a marital relationship. 
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divorce (not allowed then), or the recognition of canon law marriages 
were the focus of their attention instead.16 
The question we should ask ourselves, then, is whether section 32 
of the constitution implicitly allows a law recognizing same-sex mar-
riage. The most important item to highlight is that this section uses 
the words “man” and “woman” instead of “all persons,”17 “all” or “eve-
ryone,”18 “citizens,”19 “all citizens,”20 “Spaniards,”21 or “all Span-
iards.”22 This is the only section that makes explicit the gender distinc-
tion, so it may be significant. 
One common understanding is that the mention of equality be-
tween men and women in the conjugal relationship refers to the une-
qual husband and wife relationship that existed up until a few years 
before the enactment of the constitution. During that time women 
were subject to their spouses’ will, and required their husband’s per-
mission for a number of juridical acts.23 The constitution interdicts 
this difference of status—the guarantee that the inequality that had ex-
isted until then could not be permitted to continue, it had to be re-
flected in the constitutional text.24 
But, the equality of men and women is already recognized in sec-
tion 14 of the constitution, and there was no need to reiterate it.25 
Constitutions do not usually repeat their declarations. Moreover, the 
gender equality before the law stated in section 14 enjoys stronger pro-
tection than the assertions of section 32.26 Therefore, the section re-
lated to marriage must be considered distinct from this mention of 
men and women. 
 
 16. The Judgment of the Constitutional Court admits it, without any reservation. See FJ 
8. 
 17. C.E. art. 24.1. 
 18. Id. at art. 15, 24.2, 27.5, 28.1, 31, 43, 44. 
 19. Id. at art. 9.1, 18, 23. 
 20. Id. at art. 9.2, 41. 
 21. Id. at art. 19. 
 22. Id. at art. 2, 3, 29.1, 35.1, 47. 
 23. Diego Espín, La igualdad conyugal en la reforma del código civil, in El Nuevo Derecho 
de Familia Español (Jose Maria Castán ed., 1982). 
 24. See Judgment of the Constitutional Court FJ 8. 
 25. C.E. art. 14 (“Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discrimi-
nated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social 
condition or circumstance.”). 
 26. See id. at art. 53.2 (“Any citizen may assert a claim to protect the freedoms and rights 
recognized in section 14 and in division 1 of Chapter 2, by means of a preferential and summary 
procedure before the ordinary courts and, when appropriate, by lodging an individual appeal for 
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According to the reports, the mention of men and women intro-
duces the heterosexual element of the marital relationship.27 This is 
also the interpretation stated in the 1994 Resolution of the Constitu-
tional Court, which affirms that: 
[T]he heterosexual element of the marriage stated in the Civil Code 
is consistent with the Constitution. Public authorities can grant ad-
vantages to the family constituted by a man and a woman in opposi-
tion to homosexual unions. It does not preclude the legislator from 
enacting a regime where homosexual partners may enjoy the same 
rights and legal advantages that marriage offers.28 
In another paragraph within the text, the Constitutional Court said 
that “the union between persons of the same biological sex is neither a 
regulated juridical institution or a constitutional right; on the contrary, 
marriage between man and woman is a constitutional right.29 The 
judgment of the Constitutional Court on the Same-Sex Marriage Law 
also refers to this resolution, but in rather complicated and confusing 
terms. The court tried to dismiss the previous interpretation by saying 
that Section 32.1 cannot be understood as the establishment of the 
heterosexual principle of marriage.30 However, the court added that it 
also cannot be understood to mean that the heterosexual-only option 
was excluded. It arrives at the conclusion that considering marriage as 
only a heterosexual union, and not granting marital benefits to same-
sex unions, would be consistent with the constitution. 
There are two other sections in the constitution closely related to 
Section 32 that would support the principle that the constitutional text 
only permits heterosexual marriage. One is Section 39. Section 39 
mandates the protection of the family and asserts the commitment of 
public powers to the protection of mothers and children. This provi-
sion indicates that the drafters had a heterosexual family in mind.31 
 
protection to the Constitutional Court.”). 
 27. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9; see also Report of the General Council of the 
Judiciary, supra note 10. 
 28. Sentencia Tribunal Constitucional [S.T.C], July 11, 1994 (S.T.C., No. 222) (Spain), 
available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/16344. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. C.E. art. 39. The section reads: 
1. The public authorities ensure social, economic and legal protection of the family. 
2. The public authorities likewise ensure full protection of children, who are equal 
before the law, regardless of their parentage, and of mothers, whatever their marital 
status. The law shall provide for the possibility of the investigation of paternity. 
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The Constitutional Court does not endorse that interpretation, and 
instead proposes another reading: marriage and family are addressed 
in different sections of the Constitution—therefore, families do not 
necessarily stem from marriage and can be based on other relationships 
that should be protected as well.32 The other section is 58, part II, con-
cerning the crown, that reads, “The Queen consort, or the consort of 
the Queen, may not assume any constitutional functions, except in ac-
cordance with the provisions for the Regency.”33 Again, the drafters 
had heterosexual relationships in mind. Certainly these two sections 
are not decisive, but they are a clue to understanding the idea of mar-
riage that those who drafted the constitution intended to convey. 
In sum, the Spanish Constitution protects heterosexual marriage.34 
Homosexual unions can be granted the same benefits as marriage, but 
Section 32 of the constitution does not grant the same protections to 
homosexual marriage.35 However Section 32 also does not expressly 
ban same-sex marriage, and defers to the legislature the regulation of 
 
3. Parents must provide their children, whether born within or outside wedlock, with 
assistance of every kind while they are still under age and in other circumstances in 
which the law so establishes. 
4. Children shall enjoy the protection provided for in the international agreements 
safeguarding their rights. 
 32. S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion 
/Show/23106. 
 33. C.E. art. 58. 
 34. I will focus on Spain, but this conclusion is in line with the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. Just a week after the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court was 
released, the European Court of Human Rights issued a ruling asserting, once again, the defini-
tion of marriage as a heterosexual union: 
The Court reiterates that Article 12 of the Convention is the lex specialis for the right 
to marry. It secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found 
a family. Article 12 expressly provides for regulation of marriage by national law. The 
Court points out that Article 12 of the Convention enshrines the traditional concept 
of marriage as being between a man and a woman (Rees v. the United Kingdom, 17 
October 1986, § 49, Series A no. 106). While it is true that some Contracting States 
have extended marriage to same-sex partners, this reflects their own vision of the role 
of marriage in their societies and does not flow from an interpretation of the funda-
mental right as laid down by the Contracting States in the Convention in 1950 (see 
Parry v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42971/05, 28 November 2006; R. and F. v. 
the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 35748/05, 28 November 2006; and Schalk and Kopf 
v. Austria, no. 30141/04, § 58, ECHR 2010). 
H. v. Finland, App. No. 37359/09, at 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012). 
 35. See C.E. art. 32. The legislator who drafted the Same-Sex-Marriage Law was aware of 
this statement because the preamble avoids the foundation of same-sex marriage in Section 32. 
Instead, the preamble uses the negative reasoning (Article 32 does not proscribe it) and alludes 
to other articles that may support the regulation of same-sex marriage. 
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marriage in general. Thus the next question is whether the legislature, 
when regulating marriage, is bound by other sections of the constitu-
tion that would demand the recognition of same-sex marriage. 
III. The Right to Freely Develop the Personality 
The preamble of the Same-Sex-Marriage Law states that the right 
to freely develop a personality demands a juridical framework, which 
would include same-sex marriage.36 It makes clear that the fostering of 
equality and freedom regarding the different forms of cohabitation re-
quires a regulation that conveys these values, and cites Sections 9 and 
10 of the constitution in support of this idea.37 
According to Section 9(2) of the constitution: 
It is the responsibility of the public authorities to promote conditions 
ensuring that freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups 
to which they belong are real and effective, to remove the obstacles 
preventing or hindering their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the 
participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural and social 
life.38 
Section 10(1) deals more specifically with this matter when it says, 
“The dignity of the person, the inviolable rights which are inherent, 
the free development of the personality, the respect for the law and for 
the rights of others are the foundation of political order and social 
peace.”39 
In compliance with the constitution, freedom and equality must 
pervade all juridical acts, and failing to accomplish it will certainly be 
reproved. It would be difficult, however, to assert that people were not 
free to establish same-sex unions, and even to obtain most of the ben-
efits of marriage, before the Same-Sex Marriage Law.40 Still, being 
 
 36. Amending the Civil Code Concerning the Right to Marry B.O.E. n. 157, Jul. 2, 2005 
(Spain). The right to the free development of the personality played a similar role in Spain to the 
one that the right to privacy did in the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); or Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), among 
others. So, although the right to personal and family privacy is recognized in the Spanish Con-
stitution, the Same-Sex-Marriage Law does not mention it. 
 37. See C.E. art. 1.1 (“Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, subject 
to the rule of law, which advocates freedom, justice, equality and political pluralism as highest 
values of its legal system.”). 
 38. Id. art. 9.1. 
 39. Id. art. 10.1. 
 40. An interesting detail is that the Council of State introduces a reference to the different 
situation in the U.S. in this regard. The Report says that the high degree of controversy over 
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free to establish a same-sex union is different than including that rela-
tionship in the definition of marriage, which poses other problems. 
The Council of State deals with this reasoning in the Report. It 
affirms that the free development of personality did not demand open-
ing marriage to same-sex couples. Even more, that right would be bet-
ter protected if there were different patterns of cohabitation, each one 
with its own specific regulation, and people could choose the one they 
prefer. This would not oblige people of same-sex orientation to enter 
into a relationship whose juridical regime was designed to meet a dif-
ferent reality. As far as same-sex couples are a newly accepted pattern 
of cohabitation, the most coherent attitude is enacting a new accurate 
regulation for this pattern, one that meets its own necessities, without 
forcing it into a different regime. Basically, different institutions de-
mand different juridical regimes. This would also avoid the juridical 
uncertainty that stems from a global application of the marriage legis-
lation to another institution, which would require the intervention of 
case law to resolve any doubts or conflicts that may arise.41 
It is worth remembering that the Spanish Constitution does not 
link family, mentioned in Section 39, only with marriage, cited in Sec-
tion 32.42 The Council of State deduces from this structure that stating 
a different way of granting benefits to marriages and same-sex couples 
is consistent with the constitution.43 
The Government did not agree with the Council of State. They 
argued that banning same-sex couples’ access to marriage entailed con-
stitutionally prohibited discrimination against homosexuals. I analyze 
this reasoning in the next section. 
IV. The Principle of Nondiscrimination 
Section 14 of the constitution, cited above, establishes that there 
may not be any discrimination on the basis of sex “or any other per-
sonal or social condition or circumstance.”44 Sexual orientation is not 
 
same-sex marriage in the United States may be explained because in several States including 
same-sex couples in the marriage definition or not doing it determines the granting or refusal of 
marriage benefits to those couples. Spain neither had that problem nor is affected by conflicts 
similar to those posed by the Defense of Marriage Act and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 22. 
 41. See id. at 21–22. 
 42. See Same-Sex-Marriage Law, supra note 3. 
 43. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 23. 
 44. See C.E. art. 14. 
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mentioned in this section. It is different from sex, which alludes to a 
biological feature, but it can fall under the protection of this section, 
considering it a personal condition or circumstance. We can then as-
sert that this norm prevents the public authorities from any act that 
may involve discriminating against homosexuals.45 
Apart from that, Section 18 of the constitution protects the right 
to personal and family privacy.46 Sexual relationships are included in 
the scope of this section.47 According to the usual interpretation of this 
section, not only is the spreading of information without consent for-
bidden, but it also prohibits the interference of the public powers in 
punishing a personal behavior that is socially accepted, as would occur 
with homosexual relationships. 
Having stated what public authorities cannot do, we must consider 
what they can do. More precisely, we should find out whether the non-
discrimination principle demands opening the marital relationship to 
same-sex partners. This was, in fact, the main alleged reason to enact 
a law that will enable marriage between same sex couples in Spain—it 
would accomplish a claimed goal, the recognition of a fundamental 
right to homosexuals that had long been ignored. This idea, widely 
spread from media and government sources,48 led a considerable 
amount of people to the conviction that, finally, everybody would have 
the same rights. 
Here we come to one of the key points of the debate. It is an es-
sential principle in democratic countries that everybody enjoys the 
same fundamental rights. Hence, homosexuals have the same rights as 
 
 45. See S.T.C., Nov. 28, 2012 (mentioning that homosexuality is one of the classifications 
that deserves strict scrutiny). 
 46. C.E. art. 18.1 (“The right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own 
image is guaranteed.”). 
 47. See Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 5. 
 48. Among other things, the Secretary for Justice, with a rather complicated expression, 
said that the Bill: 
extends the rights of citizenship, at the same time that go deeper in the freedom and 
equality with which those rights are implemented, because its aim is removing a ban 
of inequality that lasted hundreds or thousands of years; there have been centuries of 
negative inequality and discrimination against some people on grounds of their sexual 
orientation. Because such people, that have the same dignity than the others, have seen 
their rights denied, and have been discriminated for a long time, this Bill looks forward 
to implement the constitutional mandate of nondiscrimination. 
Press Report on the comments from the Vice-President María Teresa Fernández de la Vega and 
the Secretary for Justice Juan Fernando López Aguilar (Oct. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/ruedas/_2004/r0110040.htm. 
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heterosexuals—no more, no less. Homosexuals and heterosexuals have 
the same right to marry in the same way. That is to say, everybody has 
the right to marry somebody of a different sex, since marriage was de-
fined as the union of a man and a woman. Therefore, the law that al-
lowed same-sex marriage was not recognizing a fundamental right that 
had been previously denied to homosexuals and that discriminated 
against them. There would have been discrimination if the right to 
marry were denied to homosexuals, or if their sexual orientation pre-
vented them, for example, from becoming civil servants or performing 
a public duty or any other such function. Similarly, it would be dis-
crimination—in this case, against heterosexuals—if same-sex marriage 
were open only to homosexual couples. Marriage required two persons 
of a different sex. No one—irrespective of sexual orientation—could 
marry anybody of the same sex. 
Therefore, when the Same-Sex Marriage Law was drafted, its real 
aim was not the recognition of a right denied to homosexuals until 
then. It was changing the definition of marriage to remove the heter-
osexual element; in other words, changing the definition of marriage 
in order to include relationships composed of two people of the same 
sex as well as two people of the opposite sex. Actually, the Law did not 
open marriage only to homosexual couples; it opened it to all same-sex 
partners, without regard to their sexual tendency. The Council of State 
followed this reasoning when it said that: 
[T]he opening of marriage to same sex couples does not entail a 
broadening of the candidates for marriage, recognizing the right of 
same-sex couples which is not protected in the Constitution; it leads 
to a modification of the marriage institution, that requires from us an 
answer to the question whether this modification is affecting mar-
riage to a greater extent than allowed by Section 32.49 
The Council sheds further light on this matter: 
[T]he removal of discrimination based on sexual orientation does not 
require the inclusion of a new pattern of couple in the marriage in-
stitution. On the one hand, because reserving marriage to heterosex-
ual couples does not convey a discriminatory treatment, neither from 
the perspective of the Constitution or the International Treaties on 
Human Rights; on the other hand, discriminations that can arise in 
 
 49. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 15. 
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society are not wiped out through the legal configuration of a mar-
riage that includes two different realities (moreover, this solution 
might even make it difficult to control those discriminations).50 
It is important to be mindful that in Spain, same-sex couples enjoy 
the same benefits as married couples. Even if marriage equality were 
not available to same-sex couples, there is no restriction on the rights 
and benefits the latter might enjoy, as opposed to what happens in 
other countries. Therefore, the aim of removing any discrimination 
pursued by the Same-Sex Marriage Bill had no real content except for 
the name of marriage, and might be achieved by means other than the 
modification of the definition of marriage. 
From another perspective, there is discrimination when different 
treatment of two comparable realities has no justification. In Spain, 
however, a family built from heterosexual marriage enjoys the protec-
tion of the constitution; homosexual partnerships do not enjoy this 
same protection, as already demonstrated. Even more, the total equiv-
alence between heterosexual marriage and marriage without the het-
erosexual element is not possible, as the juridical problems posed by 
the regulation of marital filiations disclose.51 As such, reserving mar-
riage for heterosexual couples alone is not discriminatory insofar as 
there are reasons to do so. While the reasons to act this way may or 
may not be politically defendable, they are nonetheless accurate from 
a juridical point of view. 
V. The Reasoning Behind the Institutional Guarantee 
The Judgment of the Constitutional Court devotes its largest part 
to the reasoning behind the institutional guarantee of marriage that, 
according to the Court, might be the only grounds to consider the 
Same-Sex Marriage Law inconsistent with the constitution.52 
The idea of the institutional guarantee is easy to understand and 
to endorse. It pursues the protection of certain institutions regulated 
in the constitution that can be considered structural or constitutive el-
ements of the society, protecting them from legislative action that 
 
 50. Id. at 21. 
 51. See id. at 23 (explaining that other problems may arise, for example in the field of 
inheritance law, international law, division of marital assets, and so on.); see, e.g., Decision of the 
Secretary for Justice, Department of Registries and Notaries, of July 25, 2005, B.O.E. n. 188, 
Aug. 8, 2005 (Spain) (discussing the law applicable to marriages between a Spaniard and a for-
eigner). 
 52. S.T.C., Nov. 28, 2012.  
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could suppress or essentially alter their nature.53 It is more difficult, 
however, stating what the essential content of a certain institution is, 
how that falls under that guarantee, and what features are contingent. 
The Constitutional Court did not shed light on the matter. In an early 
ruling, it said: 
The institutional guarantee does not affirm a precise content once 
and for all, but the preservation of an institution in a way that were 
recognizable for the idea the social conscience has build in every time 
and place. That guarantee is ignored when the institution is in such 
way limited that it result deprived from their existence as institution 
to become just a name. These are the limits for their development 
and implementation. Hence, the only prohibition clearly stated is the 
departure from the plain and clear idea commonly accepted of the 
institution, which, as a juridical institution, is in a wide extent deter-
mined for the law in force.54 
This is a highly relevant statement that helps explain the Consti-
tutional Court’s decision on the Same-Sex Marriage Law. 
As already said, the Judgment of the Constitutional Court on the 
Same-Sex Marriage Law affirms that opening marriage to same-sex 
couples is not required by the constitution, but it can be allowed. The 
institutional guarantee of marriage in Section 32 would be the only 
possible grounds to ban it.55 But the Constitutional Court was not 
alone in realizing the central role of the institutional guarantee on this 
issue. The Report of the Academy and the Report of the General 
Council of the Judiciary also pay special attention to the institutional 
guarantee, although they arrived at the opposite conclusion from the 
Constitutional Court. 
The institutional guarantee of marriage means that its essential el-
ements cannot be changed according to the social context or to a gen-
eral understanding of its aim and function. The alterations in marriage 
regulation may apply only to accessory elements. The Council of State 
accurately expressed this idea: 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. S.T.C., July 28, 1981.  
 55. See Same-Sex-Marriage Law, supra note 3. The Same-Sex-Marriage Law also implic-
itly assumes this interpretation, because it does not appeal to Section 32 of the Constitution to 
support the introduction of this new feature in the Civil Code, because it is not a strong enough 
rationale for the legalization of same-sex marriage. Instead, the preamble says that Section 32 
describes marriage as “a manifestation” of personal relationships based on affection, and it men-
tions other sections of the Constitution that would back up the amendment of the Civil Code. 
Same-Sex-Marriage Law, supra note 3. 
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The institutional guarantee prevents the alteration of the marriage 
institution further than its own nature allows; it does not exclude that 
lawmakers could adapt the guaranteed institutions to the spirit of the 
time, but they cannot do it on a way that makes them unidentifiable 
by the social conscience of time and place.56 
With the issue of same-sex marriage, the conflict arises when we 
come to determine whether the heterosexual feature is essential to the 
definition of marriage; in other words, whether the institutional guar-
antee includes it, or if it could be changed according to the decision of 
lawmakers on grounds of social acceptance or any other reason. Here 
the disagreement begins, and two opposing positions are clearly de-
fined. The Constitutional Court maintains that the heterosexual ele-
ment is not part of the essential content of marriage; rather, it belongs 
to the “traditional” idea of marriage, which is no longer the only or 
even the more relevant idea in today’s society.57  
The other position, held by the Royal Academy and the General 
Council of the Judiciary, takes into consideration that the heterosexual 
element is an inherent characteristic of the marital union, and there-
fore, cannot wholly be determined by the concepts of law. If society 
demands the juridical recognition of a certain kind of union that im-
plies the discharging of the heterosexual element, another law should 
regulate it, but the definition of marriage cannot be broadened to in-
clude those unions. I will examine the main arguments posed by both 
positions. 
The ruling of the Constitutional Court uses the “accommodation 
to modern life” as the main reason to consider the Same-Sex Law con-
sistent with the constitution. The Court admits that there was no real 
intent to include same-sex unions in the marriage definition when the 
constitution was enacted.58 But constitutions demand an “evolving 
reading” as a way to reassure their legitimacy and make them opera-
tional throughout time. Then, concepts must be construed according 
to the social perception in the sense that the only changes not permit-
ted would be those that made an institution not fully recognizable to 
 
 56. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 28. 
 57. This expression (“traditional” marriage) is used, for example, in the Decision of the 
Secretary for Justice, supra note 51, it entails a shade of historical and temporary meaning, not in 
the sense of something that has always existed, but of something that existed in certain times and 
places but can disappear without major concern. The Report of the General Council of the Judi-
ciary warns of this nuance on the meaning of the word applied to this case. 
 58. S.T.C. Nov. 6, 2012 (S.T.C., No. 198, FJ 8) (Spain). 
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society. This applies distinctively to the category of the institutional 
guarantee, because it conveys institutions whose content is not per-
fectly shaped in the constitution.59 
The Court uses two rationales to demonstrate that because same-
sex marriage is integrated in juridical culture, the Court may use jurid-
ical culture to interpret the definition of marriage. First, same-sex mar-
riage has been regulated in other countries belonging to the same ju-
ridical tradition, which the Court considers fits in its juridical 
systems.60 The second rationale relies on data provided by the Spanish 
Center for Sociological Research—a major supporter of same-sex mar-
riage in Spanish society.61 The Court depicts the “new image” of mar-
riage after the Civil Code’s amendment as a “community of affection 
that creates a bond,” or a  
society of mutual help between two persons who bear an equal posi-
tion in the relationship, who freely decide to unite themselves in a 
project of common family life, giving their consent to the rights and 
duties of the institution, and express it in compliance with the for-
malities stated in the Law.62  
Several problems arise from both of these rationales. 
It is difficult to believe that the changes introduced in the defini-
tion of marriage are not essential. Deprived of the heterosexual com-
ponent—or as the dissenting opinions of Judge Rodriguez described, 
deprived of any biological element—marriage would be a union of two 
free individuals, without any other requirement or imperative pur-
pose.63 The requirement that marriage must be based on affection is 
not feasible from a juridical perspective, as it is based on will. There-
fore, true will without affection is valid and marriage without true will 
is void, even if there is affection.64 Moreover, the only way for marriage 
to survive would be if many “communities of affection” with a potential 
 
 59. Id. at FJ 9. 
 60. Id. (Aragón, J., concurring) (explaining that the Judgment does not distinguish be-
tween countries that have an institutional guarantee of marriage in their Constitution and those 
that do not). 
 61. S.T.C. Nov. 28, 2012 (B.O.E. No. 286, p. 168, FJ 9) (Spain). It is surprising that the 
Judgment does not mention the data from the National Institute for Statistics, representing the 
reality—rather than the perceptions—of same-sex marriages and same sex couples in Spain. See 
infra Part VI discussing social demand. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (Arribas, J., dissenting) (arguing that this change is a leap that lacks all logic). 
 64. See Report of the Royal Academy, supra note 11, at 941. 
  
BYU Journal of Public Law [Vol. 27 
458 
for reproduction, other than that of a man and a woman, are estab-
lished. The concept proposed by the Constitutional Court is so wide 
that unions of two relatives or two friends for any purpose easily fit 
within that description. Marriage, therefore, would become an aimless 
institution, or put another way, a multiple-aim, all-purpose institution. 
Both the Royal Academy and the General Council of the Judiciary 
understand that the Spanish Constitution protects marriage as a jurid-
ical entity with certain specific features, including heterosexuality. Ac-
cording to the Academy, the institutional guarantee places some limits 
on the juridical developments of marriage because marriage enjoys a 
fixed content (including a man-woman relationship), together with 
other contingent features, and precludes public powers from passing 
laws that may suppress the structural elements, change its content, or 
create parallel legal entities to reach the same goal.65 The Report of 
the General Council of the Judiciary strongly endorses this idea and 
devotes several pages to explain it on the grounds of the structure of 
Section 32 of the constitution.66 According to the Report, Section 32-
1 contains the definition of marriage and the core elements that cannot 
be changed—heterosexuality is among them.67 Neither lawmakers nor 
Courts are allowed to modify it, because of the institutional guaran-
tee.68 Section 32-2, conversely, comprises various elements that may 
be regulated in different ways according to the social perception of the 
institution or the political reasons of the legislature since this Section 
would not be under the institutional protection of the marriage um-
brella.69 
On the subject of the role of social perception in the interpretation 
of the constitution, there is a fundamental distinction between two re-
alities that must be taken into account. The constitution is a norm 
aimed to last for a long period of time. Thus it must be applied to new, 
unforeseen situations and interpreted according to reality and consti-
tutional principles. This is different from changing the principles 
themselves, that is to say removing the foundations of the political and 
social order and replacing them with new ones. Therefore, if the public 
authorities understand that society has changed to the extent that its 
 
 65. Id. at 937. The Report mentions other examples of constitutional facts that enjoy that 
institutional guarantee, like private property or inheritance mortis causa. 
 66. Council of the Judiciary, supra note 10, at 27–28. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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constitutional definition of marriage is not accurate any more, they 
must propose a change to the constitution. But they cannot do it 
through a broad interpretation of the text in force that surpasses the 
acceptable limits.70 If the significance of marriage, or any other legal 
institution that enjoys an institutional guarantee, could be freely mod-
ified, its configuration would be subject to change along ideological 
lines by the Government in power.71 The constitution would lose its 
character of supreme norm, at least in the Spanish legal system, where 
any change or amendment to the constitution can only occur by means 
of a special procedure that requires the agreement of a qualified ma-
jority of both houses—Congress and the Senate.72 
This argument is also developed in one of the dissenting opinions, 
arguing that it is not acceptable to force an interpretation of the con-
stitution, or to make it say what it never wanted to say. The Court 
cannot override the foundations of society established in the constitu-
tion precisely to have a permanent reference for the fundamental prin-
ciples of the social order. Otherwise, it implies that it is social behavior 
that legitimizes the constitution and not the opposite.73 Legislators 
should have proposed a change in the constitution if they thought that 
Spanish society has changed so much as to set aside marriage and adopt 
a new kind of union for the foundation of society. Judge Ollero who 
wrote this dissenting opinion expressed his surprise that the legislators 
understood that an amendment to the Civil Code was needed to in-
clude same-sex couples in the definition of marriage, but an amend-
ment to section 32 of the constitution was not needed when in fact 
both dispositions have similar content.74 
 
 70. See id. at 38 for a more in-depth discussion. 
 71. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 25. 
 72. The Spanish Constitution reads: 
1. Bills on constitutional amendment must be approved by a majority of three-fifths of 
the members of each House. If there is no agreement between the Houses, an effort 
to reach it shall be made by setting up a Joint Commission of Deputies and Senators 
which shall submit a text to be voted on by the Congress and the Senate. 
2. If approval is not obtained by means of the procedure outlined in the foregoing 
clause, and provided that the text has been passed by an absolute majority of the mem-
bers of the Senate, Congress may pass the amendment by a two thirds vote in favour. 
3. Once the amendment has been passed by the Cortes Generales, it shall be submitted 
to ratification by referendum, if so requested by one tenth of the members of either 
House within fifteen days after its passage. 
C.E. art. 167. 
 73. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 28. 
 74. S.T.C. Nov. 28, 2012 (Spain) (Ollero, J., dissenting). 
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In fact, the Spanish Constitution was previously amended precisely 
because of a change in society. Specifically, the constitution was 
amended when Spain became a full member of the European Union. 
After joining the European Union, the Spanish Constitution was mod-
ified to allow all Europeans to vote in local elections, a privilege only 
given to Spaniards until then. Nobody, including the Court itself, con-
sidered “Spaniards” to be broadly interpreted as to include European 
non-Spaniards, even though the constitution did not expressly define 
“Spaniards.” The Court did not evolve the term, and the constitution 
was modified.75 
The argument of the evolution of society is still awkward when we 
see how it is plainly ignored in other cases. An example of this is Sec-
tion 57 of the constitution, which establishes the regular order of suc-
cession to the throne. According to the first paragraph, males would 
always have preference over females.76 Even though the equality be-
tween men and women is a long established principle in society, much 
more so than same-sex marriage, nobody ever understood the evolu-
tion of society and the general acceptance of equality principles would 
allow a King’s older, female descendent to inherit the Crown if the 
Prince were still alive. Certainly, many voices asked for the abolition 
of this order of succession, but always knew that it required a change 
in the constitution. Perhaps the complicated procedure to amend it is 
the reason this proposal was never seriously considered. It seems that 
in some situations admitting the evolution of society as a preeminent 
standard of interpretation of the norms is easier than in others. 
VI. The Reasoning of the Social Demand 
Social demand itself is not reason enough to make a juridical 
change constitutionally acceptable. All laws must be consistent with 
the constitutional principles. Nonetheless, social demand is not totally 
irrelevant. From a juridical point of view, social demand may make a 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. The Spanish Constitution reads: 
The Crown of Spain shall be inherited by the successors of H.M. Juan Carlos I de 
Borbon, the legitimate heir of the historic dynasty. Succession to the throne shall fol-
low the regular order of primogeniture and representation, in the following order of 
precedence: the earlier shall precede the later lines; within the same line, the closer 
degree shall precede the more distant; within the same degree, the male shall precede 
the female, and for the same sex, the older shall precede the younger. 
C.E. art. 57.1. 
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certain juridical option more accurate than another when achieving a 
specific aim. The Council of State, in the final comments of the Re-
port, says that any innovation on the matter of marriage should be 
backed by a broad social consensus, due to the need for juridical cer-
tainty and stability.77 The Report stresses that a gradual approach, ra-
ther than a traumatic change would be preferable, even if that means 
not recognizing the “right [of homosexual couples] to marry.”78 
However, the urgency of responding to a compelling social de-
mand was another one of the Spanish Government’s reasons to pass 
the Bill on same-sex marriage. Both the Vice-president and the Secre-
tary for Justice asserted that the high number of homosexual couples 
that were waiting for a decision was a decisive factor in drafting the 
bill. Certainly, the high prevalence of a behavior does not make it legal. 
But the number of people potentially affected is somewhat unclear. 
Most of the data the government offered was based on “estimations”—
the only reliable way to present a private reality that is not based on 
any kind of register, evidence, or compulsory declaration, like sexual 
orientation. 
Perhaps for these reasons, government estimates seemed to far ex-
ceed reality. I will set aside comments about other expressions on that 
matter that would need a bit more accuracy as well, for example the 
words of the Vice-President who said that this law brought to an end 
centuries of discrimination against homosexuals.79 The Secretary for 
Justice, even more enthusiastically, talked about thousands of years of 
discrimination, probably without realizing that thousands of years ago 
homosexual behavior was widespread and accepted in some Mediter-
ranean cultures, although there never was any intent to regard homo-
sexual relationships as marriages.80 
With regards to the numbers, I will limit the reference to the data 
offered by the government, without analyzing other estimates offered 
by the juridical literature on the topic that vary so widely from one 
author to another that it makes it difficult to come to any conclusion. 
The Vice-President said that there were about four million homosex-
uals in Spain, that is to say around 9% of the total population in 2005. 
The Secretary for Justice added that although there were only 11,000 
homosexual couples in the census by then (0.1% of the total number 
 
 77. Report of the Council of State, supra note 9, at 28. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Press Report, supra note 48. 
 80. See Kenneth Dover, Greek Homosexuality (1978). 
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of couples), they thought this percentage would soon rise to 10% after 
the approval of the Law. Perhaps the Secretary of Justice had second 
thoughts and made it clear that the issue at stake was not the number 
of people in same-sex relationships, but the general recognition of a 
right until then denied. 
The data provided by the National Institute for Statistics shows 
that a total of 22,104 marriages have been celebrated since the approval 
of the Law until the end of 2011.81 That means that 44,208 persons 
wanted to enter into same-sex marriages. The obvious question is what 
happens with the other 3,955,792 estimated homosexuals, or more, as 
the total Spanish population continued increasing since 2005. Of 
course, some of them would not want to marry, but is there not as high 
a prevalence of homosexuality in society, or is the Law a failure, insofar 
as only 1.1% of the estimated target was actually benefited by the Law? 
It is worth noting that the content of the Law cannot be challenged in 
this case because nothing else can be attributed to same-sex couples. 
Furthermore, the average percentage of same-sex marriages cele-
brated is 1.8% of the total number of marriages82 but 36.5% of same-
sex marriages had at least one non-Spaniard, while this percentage was 
20.9% of heterosexual couples. 
It is the sociologist’s job to interpret the data, analyzing its varia-
tions and explaining the tendencies in society they display. But it is far 
from clear that the high demand the government claimed was real in 
Spanish society. 
VII. Conclusion 
The ruling of the Constitutional Court upholding the Same-Sex-
Marriage Law lays to rest the discussion on this matter, but it will not 
be the end of the overall debate. Not all public institutions, as we have 
seen, and certainly not the whole of society, as the Constitutional 
Court recognizes,83 share the idea that marriage can change its nature. 
The word now depicts such a different relationship as the new image of 
marriage defined in the judgment. Moreover, the conclusion of the 
Constitutional Court must be understood in its proper terms. It says 
 
 81. Nat’l Institute for Statistics, http://www.ine.es (last visited March 29, 2013). 
 82. This percentage rises every year 0.1% although the number of same-sex marriages 
does not vary widely because the total number of marriages is decreasing. This difference is wider 
in the provisional numbers provided from the last year, when the total number of marriages de-
creased 4.4% and same-sex marriages increased 0.5%. 
 83. See S.T.C. Nov. 28, 2012 (Spain). 
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that the amendment of the Civil Code that introduced same-sex mar-
riage is, in its opinion, consistent with the constitution. But it did not 
say that it was demanded by the constitutional principles. Besides, the 
court stated that the other possible option, reserving marriage to het-
erosexual unions and granting homosexual unions other regulation, 
would also be consistent with the constitution.84 
But even if the door appears to be open for a law protecting mar-
riage, it seems that the debate will be restricted, in the near future, 
mainly to the academic field. There is not a political will to change the 
current status of marriage. The political party now in power, which is 
different from the one that approved the law, has improperly used this 
judgment as an excuse to avoid the matter. According to the Secretary 
for Justice, the Government is bound by this judgment.85 Surely, judg-
ments bind the courts in the sense that they must apply the law, but 
nothing would prevent this government from passing another bill reg-
ulating marriage as a heterosexual union if they consider that it is the 
right way to protect this institution. 
In any case, we cannot forget that the fundamental issue that un-
derlies the conflict. The irreconcilable opposition of two ideas of mar-
riage: a union oriented to the constitution of a family with a potential 
for reproduction and a projection on time, and marriage as a union 
based on affection, where bearing children or enduring through time 
are not necessarily essential. There seems to be no meeting point of 
these two extremes even without taking into account the ideological 
component that more often than not intermingles in the debate. Thus 
the future of the definition of marriage, even with no foreseeable 
changes in the immediate aftermath of the judgment of the Constitu-
tional Court, is not definitively settled. 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Gallardón: “No modificaré la ley y la dejaré exactamente como está,” El País (Nov. 7, 2012, 
2:27 AM), http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/11/06/actualidad/1352226880 _949406.html. 
